THAILAND: "Power shifts in south Thailand"

Jan 19, 2012
Power shifts in south Thailand
By Jason Johnson
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NA19Ae02.html

PATTANI - When Yingluck Shinawatra, the younger sister of self-exiled former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, and their Puea Thai party scored a resounding election win last July, few figured her government would be able to kick-start a peace process in the country's insurgency-prone, predominantly Malay Muslim far south region.

Five successive Thai governments had already failed to stop the historic levels of violence that has engulfed the region since January 2004. Nearly 5,000 people have died in a mess of insurgency-related, personal and criminal violence. Neither side had indicated it would drop their zero-sum orientations towards political power-sharing and other issues key to reaching some kind of settlement.

During the election campaign, however, Puea Thai signaled it
would attempt what no previous Thai government dared to accomplish peace in the restive region. In particular, Yingluck and local Muslim Puea Thai parliamentary candidates informed party supporters in the far south that they would push for a special administrative organization.

Soon after Puea Thai took office, Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Yongyuth Wichaidit declared that this campaign vow was not the government's policy. He said a model of reformed governance known as "Nakorn Pattani" was only an idea of former prime minister and army commander General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who left his senior advisory role in the party months before the election due to alleged anti-monarchy sentiments in Thaksin's "Red Shirt" protest movement.

Puea Thai opponents have since criticized the party for playing the autonomy card on the campaign trail to garner votes in the region, which has long been home to separatist groups and others who dream of independence. Yet, the Puea Thai-led government is walking an extremely fine line with the country's monarchy and military, the twin pillars of the Thai state.

Since 2006, Thailand's military and courts have ousted three Thaksin-aligned governments, and any moves that threaten military interests could potentially result in Puea Thai's opponents seeking a similar dissolution of Yingluck's government. With the military's long history of maintaining centralized power, Puea Thai has had little or no choice but to back off from the autonomy issue for the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and four districts of adjacent Songkhla.

Initially, Puea Thai indicated it would yield to military interests in the far south. Outgoing premier Abhisit Vejjajiva and his Democrat Party pushed through a bill in parliament last year that gave the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), located in Yala town, more civilian control. Rather than working under the authority of the military-controlled Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC), the SBPAC's secretary-general is now appointed by, and reports directly to, the prime minister.

In September, however, the Puea Thai government signaled it would curtail that Democrat Party-led initiative. Sources said that the army influenced the 44-year-old Yingluck to introduce a new organization called the Southern Border Provinces Problem Solving and Development Center (SBPSDC), which would oversee the SBPAC.

According to army sources, the new structure would create more unity of security and administrative organizations in the far south. But other sources claim that the new plan and command structure reflected the army's desire for more authority and budgetary allowances.

Conflicted motivations
Since 2004, analysts - and most especially local Malay Muslims - have claimed that army figures are interested in prolonging the conflict because of the hefty budgetary allowances they receive for counter-insurgency operations. Successive Thai governments have allocated some 1.6 billion baht (US$51 million) over the course of nine budget calendars to counter the insurgency since it restarted in early 2004.

In October, some 30 members of the SBPAC's 49-member advisory council expressed disapproval of the initiative in a letter to Deputy Prime Minister Yongyuth. SBPAC council members, who are overwhelmingly local Muslims and feel they have very little real authority, strongly supported Abhisit's effort to reduce ISOC's role. Under ISOC's control, many council members resented communicating and coordinating with the army, and felt that army oversight limited the SBPAC's effectiveness.

In spite of expectations that the SBPSDC would soon be introduced, the government recently decided to shelve the new structure. Because of a condition within last year's law, the SBPSDC could not legally oversee the SBPAC, sources said. Those same sources also said that the National Security Council, now headed by Thaksin loyalist Wichean Potephosree, and SBPAC influence led the government to scrap the initiative.

An army source said that the government will instead likely set up a committee for the far south but it will not have the power to oversee the SBPAC. One figure in the SBPAC who sources said played a key role in the decision to drop the SBPSDC is the SBPAC's new secretary general, Police Colonel Tawee Sodsong.

The Yingluck government replaced Democrat loyalist Panu Uthairat with Tawee, the Justice Ministry's deputy permanent secretary, in September. Tawee is the first head of the SBPAC not to come from the Ministry of Interior. Under its new structure, the SBPAC's secretary-general is no longer required to come from this unit of governance first established under the reign of King Chulalongkorn in the late 19th century to oversee provincial administration.

Sources said Tawee is a rising star in Thaksin's camp. Under Thaksin's tenure from 2004 to 2006 he served as the deputy secretary general of the Department of Special Investigations (DSI). Later, in 2008 during the Thaksin-aligned government of Samak Sundaravej, Tawee was appointed director general of the DSI.

Tawee was involved with the case against alleged Malay Muslim insurgents and former Thai Rak Thai politician Natjmuddin Umar, who was accused of involvement in the January 4, 2004 arms heist at an army camp in Choi Airong district of Narathiwat that many have interpreted as the launch of the insurgency.

Now, in an effort to reach out to individuals who may be able to connect to the shadowy armed separatist movement, Tawee has hired the former MP as a special consultant, sources said. The same sources told Asia Times Online that Natjmuddin influenced Tawee's recent decision to reopen the Islam Burapha private Islamic school in Narathiwat. Four years ago, the school was closed down after local army informants motivated a raid that revealed the school was used as an insurgent sanctuary.

Tawee's apparent more conciliatory approach notwithstanding, he also has plenty of detractors due to his past work under Thaksin. Human-rights lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit represented the Malay Muslims who accused the police of torture while in custody for their alleged role in a 2004 arms heist. Somchai was later kidnapped and murdered in 2004, and Tawee was the commanding officer of the five police officers allegedly responsible for his death. As a result, many human-rights workers have suspected that Tawee wittingly permitted the police officers' actions.

Police power
Meanwhile, several sources said the non-government organization (NGO) community influenced the Fourth Army Region, the south's regional army, to shut down the notorious interrogation center at the Inkhayut Camp in Pattani. Bizarrely referred to as a "resort" by army authorities, the center's officials had been accused of torturing suspected insurgents.

Human-rights workers and other activists increased awareness of alleged torture at the center following the hanging death of suspected insurgent and detainee Sulaiman Naesa in May 2010. There is extremely strong evidence that indicates Sulaiman committed suicide but activist presentations of the case led to widespread beliefs in the media and among foreign embassy officials in Bangkok that Sulaiman was murdered by camp authorities. The case is pending in court.

Now, suspected insurgents will instead be turned over to the police's main interrogation center in the far south, located at the Southern Border Provinces Police Bureau in Yala town. Several sources said the location shift from the army to the police in part reflects Thaksin's close ties to the police.

One source said that Pattani-based Lieutenant General Samret Sirai and former deputy national police chief General Adul Saengsingkaew, who now heads the Office of Narcotics Control Board, played roles in influencing the Fourth Army Region's decision. However, another source emphasized that many leading figures in the Fourth Army Region had been considering alternatives to the center in light of the heightened scrutiny.

In spite of Thaksin's use of a heavy-handed approach in the far south during his time as prime minister, sources said Sirai, a Thaksin favorite who is widely respected in the army, has long supported a more conciliatory approach. One source said Sirai would like to dissolve the highly controversial Emergency Decree and replace it with a quasi-amnesty under the Internal Security Act. The amnesty is currently only in place in five largely violence-free districts in the region.

According to army sources, a full amnesty is an issue that has been debated, and even supported, by some army figures. The current commander of the Fourth Army Region, Lieutenant General Udomchai Thammasarorach, has stated on several occasions that an expanded amnesty is a necessary step in halting rebel-instigated violence. However, in an interview with Asia Times Online late last year, Udomchai indicated that this would not be implemented in the near future.

However, one move towards a possible negotiated settlement is the government's recent endorsement of an official dialogue track, which means that confidential dialogue with the armed movement will restart. Since 2006, the National Security Council has been engaged in talks with Malay Muslims who claim to have sway over on-the-ground insurgents.

The talks have been heavily criticized by the army as well as some political activists in the far south on the grounds that the representatives have little or no influence on a majority of separatists connected to the violence.

Some army sources as well as local political activists argue that insurgent leaders view Bangkok's ongoing political instability as a political opportunity. With national level political uncertainty expected to endure in light of Thailand's looming royal succession, Malay Muslim separatists may be positioning themselves for future debates over institutional reform across the country. And with Yingluck's government reluctant to push for political reforms and a full amnesty, expect the violence to continue.

Jason Johnson is an independent researcher and consultant covering southernmost Thailand. He is currently based in Pattani province, southern Thailand, and may be reached at jrj.johnson@gmail.com