Board of Governors
GOV
/2008/30
Date: 9 July 2008
Restricted Distribution
Original: English
For official use only
Nuclear Verification
The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and
Additional Protocols
An Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of
Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities
Recommended Action
•
It is recommended that the Board authorize the Director General to conclude with the
Government of India, and subsequently implement, the draft Safeguards Agreement reproduced
in the Attachment hereto.
Atoms for Peace
GOV/2008/30
Page 1
Nuclear Verification
The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and
Additional Protocols
An Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of
Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities
1. Referring to its desire to expand civil nuclear cooperation with other Member States of the
Agency and to the relevance in this context of the understanding between India and the United States
of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, the Government of India
requested the Agency to conclude with it an agreement for the application of safeguards with respect
to its civilian nuclear facilities.
2. A draft safeguards agreement was accordingly negotiated with India (attached) using the relevant
guidance documents that have been adopted by the Board of Governors for the purposes of concluding
INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements.
3. The draft agreement provides for the application of safeguards to facilities, nuclear material, nonnuclear
material, equipment and components as set out in paragraph 11 of the agreement.
4. At the request of India the draft text includes provisions for the use of the agreement as an
"umbrella agreement". Paragraph 14 thereof provides that any facility notified by India to the Agency
will become subject to safeguards under this agreement. Such facilities will be listed on the Annex to
the agreement, which will be published, and updated, as India notifies the Agency of additional
facilities. In addition, paragraph 22 provides for the possibility of safeguarding under the agreement
items that are already subject to safeguards under other Safeguards Agreements concluded by India
with the Agency, subject to agreement by the parties to such other Safeguards Agreements. As a
consequence, the application of safeguards under those Safeguards Agreements would be suspended
for so long as this agreement remains in force.
5. Paragraph 99 provides that India shall take all suitable measures for the physical protection of
facilities and nuclear material subject to the agreement, taking into account the recommendations
made in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, as may be amended from time to time.
6. In paragraph 100 of the draft agreement India undertakes to establish and maintain a system of
accounting for and control of all items subject to safeguards under the agreement, in accordance with
provisions to be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
7. It will be also noted that the draft agreement includes an undertaking by India and the Agency
that in the event that India decides to offer an enrichment plant in the future as a facility subject to the
agreement, India and the Agency shall consult and agree on the application of the Agency’s safeguards
procedures before any such facility is subject to the agreement (paragraph 86).
GOV/2008/30
Page 2
8. When safeguards are applied to new facilities under this agreement, the Agency will incur
additional expenses. On the assumption that 2009 will be the first year that the Agency will start
implementing this agreement at new facilities, a supplementary appropriation to the regular budget
will be requested as agreed by the Board of Governors at its 9 July 2007 session. The estimated cost
for the first year for one new facility would be in the order of € 1.2 million.
GOV/2008/30
Attachment
DRAFT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
RECOGNIZING the significance India attaches to civilian nuclear energy as an efficient,
clean and sustainable energy source for meeting global energy demand, in particular for meeting
India’s growing energy needs;
WHEREAS India is committed to the full development of its national three-stage nuclear
programme to meet the twin challenges of energy security and protection of the environment;
WHEREAS India has a sovereign and inalienable right to carry out nuclear research and
development activities for the welfare of its people and other peaceful purposes;
WHEREAS India, a State with advanced nuclear technology, wishes to expand civil
nuclear cooperation for its national development;
WHEREAS India is desirous of further expanding cooperation with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") and its Member States with the
objective of the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on a stable, reliable
and predictable basis;
WHEREAS India supports the role of the Agency in the promotion of the safe and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy as set forth in the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the
"Statute");
WHEREAS India and the Agency have long standing cooperation in various aspects of
the Agency’s activities;
RECOGNIZING that such cooperation between India and the Agency must be carried
out with full respect for the objectives of the Statute and with due observance of the sovereign rights
of India;
WHEREAS the Statute authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards, at the request of the
parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State to any of the State’s
activities in the field of atomic energy and, in this context:
Noting the relevance for this Agreement of the understandings between India and the
United States of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005,
in which India, inter alia, has stated its willingness:
•
to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes
in a phased manner;
2
•
to file with the Agency a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities
(hereinafter referred to as "the Declaration");
•
to take a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency
safeguards;
Noting also for the purposes of this Agreement that:
•
India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards so as to
facilitate full civil nuclear cooperation between India and Member States of the
Agency and to provide assurance against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear
material from civilian use at any time;
•
An essential basis of India’s concurrence to accept Agency safeguards under an
India-specific safeguards agreement (hereinafter referred to as "this Agreement")
is the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary
conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including
reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in
several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic
reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime
of India’s reactors; and
•
India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its
civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies;
WHEREAS India is desirous of expanding civil nuclear cooperation with other Member
States of the Agency;
WHEREAS the conclusion of this Agreement is intended to facilitate the broadest
possible cooperation between India and Member States of the Agency in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and ensure international participation in the further development of India’s civilian nuclear
programme on a sustained and long–term basis;
RECALLING that the Agency in accordance with its Statute and safeguards system must
take into account, in the implementation of safeguards in India, the need to avoid hampering the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, economic and technological development or international
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; respect health, safety and physical
protection and related security provisions in force in India; and take every precaution to protect
commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to
its knowledge;
WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Agreement shall be
kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of effective and efficient Agency safeguards;
WHEREAS India has requested the Agency to apply safeguards with respect to items
subject to this Agreement;
WHEREAS the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the
"Board") acceded to that request on …………;
NOW THEREFORE, taking into account the above, India and the Agency have agreed as
follows:
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I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS
1. India undertakes that none of the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11,
shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose
and that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
2. The Agency undertakes to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, to
the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11, so as to ensure, as far as it is able,
that no such item is used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other
military purpose and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
3. The purpose of safeguards under this Agreement is to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded
nuclear material from civilian use at any time.
4. The application of safeguards under this Agreement is intended to facilitate implementation of
relevant bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party, which are essential to the
accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement.
5. Bearing in mind Article II of the Statute, the Agency shall implement safeguards in a manner
designed to avoid hampering India’s economic or technological development, and not to hinder or
otherwise interfere with any activities involving the use by India of nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by
India independent of this Agreement for its own purposes.
6. The safeguards procedures set forth in this document shall be implemented in a manner designed
to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of
nuclear activities.
7. In implementing safeguards, the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and
industrial secrets. No member of the Agency’s staff shall disclose, except to the Director General
and to such other members of the staff as the Director General may authorize to have such
information by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, any commercial or
industrial secret or any other confidential information coming to his knowledge by reason of the
implementation of safeguards by the Agency.
8. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any
information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of safeguards in India, except
that:
(a) Specific information relating to such implementation in India may be given to the Board and
to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in
connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its
safeguards responsibilities;
(b) Summarized lists of items being safeguarded by the Agency may be published upon decision
of the Board; and
(c) Additional information may be published upon decision of the Board and if all States directly
concerned agree.
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9. In the light of Article XII.A.5 of the Statute, safeguards shall continue with respect to produced
special fissionable material and to any materials substituted therefor.
10. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect other rights and obligations of India under international
law.
II. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS
A. ITEMS SUBJECT TO THIS AGREEMENT
11. The items subject to this Agreement shall be:
(a) Any facility listed in the Annex to this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to
paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement;
(b) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India
which are required to be safeguarded pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to
which India is a party;
(c) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material,
produced, processed or used in or by the use of a facility listed in the Annex or in or by the
use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in
paragraph 11(b);
(d) Any nuclear material substituted in accordance with paragraph 27 or 30(d) of this Agreement
for nuclear material referred to in paragraph 11(b) or 11(c) of this Agreement;
(e) Any heavy water substituted in accordance with paragraph 32 of this Agreement for heavy
water subject to this Agreement;
(f) Any facility other than a facility identified in paragraph 11(a) above, or any other location in
India, while producing, processing, using, fabricating or storing any nuclear material,
non-nuclear material, equipment or components referred to in paragraph 11(b), (c), (d) or (e)
of this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of this Agreement.
12. The scope of this Agreement is limited to the items subject to this Agreement as defined in
paragraph 11 above.
Declaration
13. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, and a determination by India that all conditions
conducive to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement are in place, India shall file
with the Agency a Declaration, based on its sovereign decision to place voluntarily its civilian
nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in a phased manner.
Notifications
14.
(a) India, on the basis of its sole determination, shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision
to offer for Agency safeguards a facility identified by India in the Declaration referred to in
paragraph 13, or any other facility to be determined by India. Any facility so notified by
India to the Agency will be included in the Annex, and become subject to this Agreement, as
of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
(b) Should India, on the basis of its sole determination, decide to import or transfer any nuclear
5
material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components subject to this Agreement to any
facility or other location in India provided for in paragraph 11(f) of this Agreement, it shall so
notify the Agency. Any such facility or location so notified by India pursuant to this
sub-paragraph shall become subject to this Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency
of such written notification from India.
15. India shall notify the Agency of the receipt of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material,
equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b) of this Agreement within four weeks of
the arrival in India of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components.
Provision of Information to the Agency
16. In the event that India’s notification pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement relates to a
facility subject to Agency safeguards under another Safeguards Agreement or Agreements in
India at the time of entry into force of this Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, along with
the relevant notification, such information as is required pursuant to the other Safeguards
Agreement or Agreements as relates to any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and
components subject to safeguards thereunder.
17. With respect to any other facility listed in the Annex pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this
Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, within four weeks of the relevant notification, with:
(a) a list of all nuclear material at each such facility; and
(b) where relevant, and if required pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to which
India is party, information relating to:
(i) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India
for production , processing, storage or use in such facility;
(ii) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material,
produced, processed or used in or by the use of such facility or in or by the use of any
nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India for
production, processing or use in such facility.
18. Each notification pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Agreement shall include all information relevant
to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components so notified, including
the facility or location where the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and
components so notified will be received.
19. The information provided by India pursuant to paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of this Agreement shall
specify, inter alia, to the extent relevant, the nuclear and chemical composition, physical form and
quantity of the nuclear material; the date of shipment; the date of receipt; the identity of the
consigner and the consignee; and any other relevant information, such as the type and capacity of
any facility (or parts thereof), components or equipment; and the type and quantity of non-nuclear
material. In the case of a facility or other location subject to this Agreement, the information to be
provided shall include the type and capacity of that facility or location, and any other relevant
information.
20. India shall thereafter notify the Agency by means of reports, in accordance with this Agreement,
of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph
11(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Agreement. The Agency may verify the calculations of the amounts
and/or quantities of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components, and
appropriate adjustments shall be made by agreement between India and the Agency.
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21. The Agency shall maintain an inventory of items subject to this Agreement. The Agency shall
send a copy of the inventory it maintains with respect to such information to India every twelve
months and also at any other times specified by India in a request communicated to the Agency at
least two weeks in advance.
B. SAFEGUARDS UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS
22. The application of Agency safeguards under other Safeguards Agreements concluded by India
with the Agency and in force at the time of entry into force of this Agreement may, subject to
agreement by the Parties to such other Safeguards Agreements and following notification by India
of the relevant facilities pursuant to paragraph 14(a), be suspended while this Agreement is in
force. The application of safeguards under this Agreement to nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or components subject to safeguards under such other Agreements shall
commence as of the date of receipt by the Agency of India’s notification. India’s undertaking not
to use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose, and its undertaking
that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, shall continue to apply.
C. EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS
General Exemptions
23. Nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards shall be exempted from safeguards
at the request of India, provided that the material so exempted in India may not at any time
exceed:
(a) 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the
following:
(i) Plutonium;
(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20 %) and above, taken account of by multiplying its
weight by its enrichment;
(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20 %) and above that of natural uranium, taken
account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;
(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above
0.005 (0.5 %);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.
Exemptions Related to Reactors
24. Produced or used nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards because it is
being or has been produced, processed or used in a reactor which has been supplied wholly or
substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by
the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under
a safeguards agreement; or because it is being or has been produced in or by the use of
safeguarded nuclear material, shall be exempted from safeguards if:
(a) It is plutonium produced in the fuel of a reactor whose rate of production does not exceed 100
grams of plutonium per year; or
7
(b) It is produced in a reactor determined by the Agency to have a maximum calculated power for
continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, or is used in such a reactor and would
not be subject to safeguards except for such use, provided that the total power of the reactors
with respect to which these exemptions apply in any State may not exceed 6 thermal
megawatts.
25. Produced special fissionable material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards only because
it has been produced in or by the use of safeguarded nuclear material shall in part be exempted
from safeguards if it is produced in a reactor in which the ratio of fissionable isotopes within
safeguarded nuclear material to all fissionable isotopes is less than 0.3 (calculated each time any
change is made in the loading of the reactor and assumed to be maintained until the next such
change). Such fraction of the produced material as corresponds to the calculated ratio shall be
subject to safeguards.
D. SUSPENSION OF SAFEGUARDS
26. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material may be suspended while the material is transferred,
under an arrangement or agreement approved by the Agency, for the purpose of processing,
reprocessing, testing, research or development, within India or to any other Member State or to an
international organization, provided that the quantities of nuclear material with respect to which
safeguards are thus suspended in India may not at any time exceed:
(a) 1 effective kilogram of special fissionable material;
(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment 0.005
(0.5 %);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.
27. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose
of reprocessing may also be suspended if the State or States concerned have, with the agreement
of the Agency, placed under safeguards substitute nuclear material in accordance with paragraph
30(d) of this Agreement for the period of suspension. In addition, safeguards with respect to
plutonium contained in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose of reprocessing may be
suspended for a period not to exceed six months if the State or States concerned have, with the
agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards a quantity of uranium whose enrichment in the
isotope uranium-235 is not less than 0.9 (90%) and the uranium-235 content of which is equal in
weight to such plutonium. Upon expiration of the said six months or the completion of
reprocessing, whichever is earlier, safeguards shall, with the agreement of the Agency, be applied
to such plutonium and shall cease to apply to the uranium substituted therefor.
28. Under conditions specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall suspend safeguards
with respect to any parts of the facilities listed in the Annex which are removed for maintenance
or repair.
E. TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
29. The termination of safeguards on items subject to this Agreement shall be implemented taking
into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973).
30. Nuclear material shall no longer be subject to safeguards under this Agreement after:
8
(a) It has been returned to the State that originally supplied it (whether directly or through the
Agency), if it was subject to safeguards only by reason of such supply and if:
(i) It was not improved while under safeguards; or
(ii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been
separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated
; or
(b) The Agency has determined that:
(i) It was subject to safeguards only by reason of its use in a principal nuclear facility which
has been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement, submitted to
safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral
arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement;
(ii) It has been removed from such a facility; and
(iii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been
separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated;
or
(c) The Agency has determined that it has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that
it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or
has become practicably irrecoverable; or
(d) India has, with the agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards, as a substitute, such
amount of the same element, not otherwise subject to safeguards, as the Agency has
determined contains fissionable isotopes:
(i) Whose weight (with due allowance for processing losses) is equal to or greater than the
weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which safeguards are to
terminate; and
(ii) Whose ratio by weight to the total substituted element is similar to or greater than the
ratio by weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which
safeguards are to terminate to the total weight of such material;
provided that the Agency may agree to the substitution of plutonium for uranium-235
contained in uranium whose enrichment is not greater than 0.05 (5.0 %); or
(e) It has been transferred out of India under paragraph 33(d) of this Agreement, provided that
such material shall again be subject to safeguards if it is returned to India; or
(f) The terms of this Agreement, pursuant to which it was subject to safeguards under this
Agreement, no longer apply, by expiration of this Agreement or otherwise.
31. If India wishes to use safeguarded source material for non-nuclear purposes, such as the
production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which
the safeguards on such material may be terminated.
32. Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have
jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the
point of view of safeguards. Safeguards on non-nuclear material, equipment and components
subject to this Agreement may be terminated as and when the non-nuclear material, equipment or
9
components have been returned to the supplier or arrangements have been made by the Agency to
safeguard the non-nuclear material, equipment or components in the State to which it is being
transferred, or when India and the Agency have jointly determined that the non-nuclear material,
equipment or component in question has been consumed, is no longer usable for any nuclear
activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practicably irrecoverable.
Safeguards may be terminated on heavy water upon India’s placing under safeguards as substitute
the same amount of heavy water of equivalent or better heavy water concentration.
F. TRANSFERS
33. No safeguarded nuclear material shall be transferred outside the jurisdiction of India until the
Agency has satisfied itself that one or more of the following conditions apply:
(a) The material is being returned, under the conditions specified in paragraph 30(a) of this
Agreement, to the State that originally supplied it; or
(b) The material is being transferred subject to the provisions of paragraph 26 or 27 of this
Agreement; or
(c) Arrangements have been made by the Agency to safeguard the material in the State to which
it is being transferred; or
(d) The material was not subject to safeguards pursuant to a project agreement and will be
subject, in the State to which it is being transferred, to safeguards other than those of the
Agency but generally consistent with such safeguards and accepted by the Agency.
34. India shall notify the Agency of its intention to transfer within its jurisdiction any nuclear
material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component subject to this Agreement to any facility
or location in India to which paragraph 11(f) applies and shall provide to the Agency, before such
transfer is effected, the necessary information to enable the Agency to make arrangements for the
application of safeguards to such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component
after its transfer. The Agency shall also be given the opportunity as early as possible in advance of
such a transfer to review the design of the facility for the sole purpose of determining that the
arrangements provided for in this Agreement can be effectively applied. India may transfer the
nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component only after the Agency has
confirmed that it has made such arrangements.
35. India shall notify the Agency of its intention to transfer any nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or component subject to this Agreement to a recipient which is not under the
jurisdiction of India. Except as provided for in paragraph 30(a) of this Agreement, such nuclear
material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component shall be so transferred only after the
Agency has informed India that it has satisfied itself that Agency safeguards will apply with
respect to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component in the recipient
country. Upon receipt by the Agency of the notification of transfer from India and the
confirmation of receipt by the recipient country, safeguards on such nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or component shall be terminated under this Agreement.
36. The notifications referred to in paragraphs 34 and 35 of this Agreement shall be made to the
Agency sufficiently in advance to enable it to make the arrangements required before the transfer
is effected. The Agency shall promptly take any necessary action. The time limits for and the
contents of these notifications shall be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
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III. SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES
A. GENERAL PROCEDURES
Introduction
37. The safeguards procedures to be applied by the Agency are those specified in this Agreement, as
well as such additional procedures as result from technological developments, and other
procedures as may be agreed to between the Agency and India. The safeguards procedures set
forth below shall be followed, as far as relevant, with respect to any item subject to this
Agreement.
38. The Agency shall conclude with India Subsidiary Arrangements concerning the implementation
of the safeguards procedures referred to above. The Subsidiary Arrangements shall also include
any necessary arrangements for the application of safeguards to any item subject to this
Agreement, including such containment and surveillance measures as are required for the
effective implementation of safeguards. The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force no
later than six months after entry into force of this Agreement.
Design Review
39. The Agency shall review the design of principal nuclear facilities, for the sole purpose of
satisfying itself that a facility will permit the effective application of safeguards.
40. The design review of a principal nuclear facility shall take place at as early a stage as possible. In
particular, such review shall be carried out in the case of:
(a) An Agency project, before the project is approved;
(b) A bilateral or multilateral arrangement under which the responsibility for administering
safeguards is to be transferred to the Agency, or an activity or facility unilaterally submitted
by India, before the Agency assumes safeguards responsibilities with respect to the facility;
(c) A transfer of safeguarded nuclear material to a principal nuclear facility whose design has not
previously been reviewed, before such transfer takes place; and
(d) A significant modification of a principal nuclear facility whose design has previously been
reviewed, before such modification is undertaken.
41. To enable the Agency to perform the required design review, India shall submit to it relevant
design information sufficient for the purpose, including information on such basic characteristics
of the principal nuclear facility as may bear on the Agency's safeguards procedures. The Agency
shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its
responsibility under this section. It shall complete the review promptly after the submission of this
information by India and shall notify the latter of its conclusions without delay.
42. If the Agency wishes to examine design information which India regards as sensitive, the Agency
shall, if India so requests, conduct the examination on premises in India. Such information should
not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for
examination by the Agency in India.
Records
43. India shall arrange for the keeping of records with respect to principal nuclear facilities and also
with respect to all safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities. For this purpose India and
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the Agency shall agree on a system of records with respect to each facility and also with respect to
such material, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by India in sufficient time to allow the
Agency to review them before the records need to be kept.
44. All records shall be kept in English.
45. The records shall consist, as appropriate, of:
(a) Accounting records of all safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Operating records for principal nuclear facilities.
46. All records shall be retained for at least two years.
Reports
General Requirements
47. India shall submit to the Agency reports with respect to the production, processing and use of
safeguarded nuclear material in or outside principal nuclear facilities. For this purpose, India and
the Agency shall agree on a system of reports with respect to each facility and also with respect to
safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by
India in sufficient time to allow the Agency to review them before the reports need to be
submitted. The reports need include only such information as is relevant for the purpose of
safeguards.
48. All reports shall be submitted in English.
Routine Reports
49. Routine reports shall be based on the records compiled in accordance with paragraphs 43 to 46 of
this Agreement and shall consist, as appropriate, of:
(a) Accounting reports showing the receipt, transfer out, inventory and use of all safeguarded
nuclear material. The inventory shall indicate the nuclear and chemical composition and
physical form of all material and its location on the date of the report; and
(b) Operating reports showing the use that has been made of each principal nuclear facility since
the last report and, as far as possible, the programme of future work in the period until the
next routine report is expected to reach the Agency.
50. The first routine report shall be submitted as soon as:
(a) There is any safeguarded nuclear material to be accounted for; or
(b) The principal nuclear facility to which it relates is in a condition to operate.
Progress in Construction
51. The Agency may request information as to when particular stages in the construction of a
principal nuclear facility have been or are to be reached.
Special Reports
52. India shall report to the Agency without delay:
12
(a) If any unusual incident occurs involving actual or potential loss or destruction of, or damage
to, any safeguarded nuclear material or principal nuclear facility;
(b) If there is good reason to believe that safeguarded nuclear material is lost or unaccounted for
in quantities that exceed the normal operating and handling losses that have been accepted by
the Agency as characteristic of the facility; or
(c) Disruption of operation of facilities listed in the Annex on account of material violation or
breach of bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party.
53. India shall report to the Agency, as soon as possible, and in any case within two weeks, any
transfer not requiring advance notification that will result in a significant change (to be defined by
the Agency in agreement with India) in the quantity of safeguarded nuclear material in a principal
nuclear facility. Such report shall indicate the amount and nature of the material and its intended
use.
Amplification of Reports
54. At the Agency's request, India shall submit amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far
as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
Inspections
General Procedures
55. The Agency may inspect any items subject to this Agreement.
56. The purpose of safeguards inspections under this Agreement shall be to verify compliance by
India with this Agreement and to assist India in complying with this Agreement and in resolving
any questions arising out of the implementation of safeguards.
57. The number, duration and intensity of inspections actually carried out shall be kept to the
minimum consistent with the effective implementation of safeguards, and if the Agency considers
that the authorized inspections are not all required, fewer shall be carried out.
58. Inspectors shall neither operate any facility themselves nor direct the staff of a facility to carry out
any particular operation.
Routine Inspections
59. Routine inspections may include, as appropriate:
(a) Audit of records and reports;
(b) Verification of the amount of safeguarded nuclear material by physical inspection,
measurement and sampling;
(c) Examination of principal nuclear facilities, including a check of their measuring instruments
and operating characteristics; and
(d) Check of the operations carried out at principal nuclear facilities.
60. Whenever the Agency has the right of access to a principal nuclear facility at all times, it may
perform inspections of which notice as required by paragraph 4 of the Inspectors Document need
13
not be given, in so far as this is necessary for the effective application of safeguards. The actual
procedures to implement these provisions shall be agreed upon between India and the Agency.
Initial Inspections of a Principal Nuclear Facility
61. To verify that the construction of a principal nuclear facility is in accordance with the design
reviewed by the Agency, an initial inspection or inspections of the facility may be carried out:
(a) As soon as possible after the facility has come under Agency safeguards, in the case of a
facility already in operation; and
(b) Before the facility starts to operate, in other cases.
62. The measuring instruments and operating characteristics of the facility shall be reviewed to the
extent necessary for the purpose of implementing safeguards. Instruments that will be used to
obtain data on the nuclear materials in the facility may be tested to determine their satisfactory
functioning. Such testing may include the observation by inspectors of commissioning or routine
tests by the staff of the facility, but shall not hamper or delay the construction, commissioning or
normal operation of the facility.
Special Inspections
63. The Agency may carry out special inspections if:
(a) The study of a report indicates that such inspection is desirable; or
(b) Any unforeseen circumstance requires immediate action.
The Board shall subsequently be informed of the reasons for and the results of each such
inspection.
64. The Agency may also carry out special inspections of substantial amounts of safeguarded nuclear
material that are to be transferred outside the jurisdiction of India, for which purpose India shall
give the Agency sufficient advance notice of any such proposed transfer.
B. SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR REACTORS
Reports
65. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be agreed between the Agency and India,
taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections. However, at least two such
reports shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such reports be required in
any year.
Inspections
66. One of the initial inspections of a reactor shall if possible be made just before the reactor first
reaches criticality.
14
67. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of a reactor and of the safeguarded nuclear
material in it shall be determined from the following table:
Whichever is the largest of:
(a) Facility inventory (including loading);
(b) Annual throughput;
(c) Maximum potential annual production of special
fissionable material
(Effective kilograms of nuclear material)
Maximum number
of routine inspections
annually
Up to 1
More than 1 and up to 5
More than 5 and up to 10
More than 10 and up to 15
More than 15 and up to 20
More than 20 and up to 25
More than 25 and up to 30
More than 30 and up to 35
More than 35 and up to 40
More than 40 and up to 45
More than 45 and up to 50
More than 50 and up to 55
More than 55 and up to 60
More than 60
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Right of access at all times
68. The actual frequency of inspection of a reactor shall take account of:
(a) The fact that India possesses irradiated fuel reprocessing facilities:
(b) The nature of the reactor; and
(c) The nature and amount of the nuclear material produced or used in the reactor.
C. SPECIAL PROCEDURES RELATING TO SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR
MATERIAL OUTSIDE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES
Nuclear Material in Research and Development Facilities
Routine Reports
69. Only accounting reports need be submitted in respect of nuclear material in research and
development facilities. The frequency of submission of such routine reports shall be agreed
between the Agency and India, taking into account the frequency established for routine
inspections; however, at least one such report shall be submitted each year and in no case shall
more than 12 such reports be required in any year.
Routine Inspections
70. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in a research and
development facility shall be that specified in the table in paragraph 67 of this Agreement for the
total amount of material in the facility.
15
Source Material in Sealed Storage
71. The following simplified procedures for safeguarding stockpiled source material shall be applied
if India undertakes to store such material in a sealed storage facility and not to remove it
therefrom without previously informing the Agency.
Design of Storage Facilities
72. India shall submit to the Agency information on the design of each sealed storage facility and
agree with the Agency on the method and procedure for sealing it.
Routine Reports
73. Two routine accounting reports in respect of source material in sealed storage shall be submitted
each year.
Routine Inspections
74. The Agency may perform one routine inspection of each sealed storage facility annually.
Removal of Material
75. India may remove safeguarded source material from a sealed storage facility after informing the
Agency of the amount, type and intended use of the material to be removed, and providing
sufficient other data in time to enable the Agency to continue safeguarding the material after it has
been removed.
Nuclear Material in Other Locations
76. Except to the extent that safeguarded nuclear material outside of principal nuclear facilities is
covered by any of the provisions set forth in paragraphs 69 to 75 of this Agreement, the following
procedures shall be applied with respect to such material (for example, source material stored
elsewhere than in a sealed storage facility, or special fissionable material used in a sealed neutron
source in the field).
Routine Reports
77. Routine accounting reports in respect of all safeguarded nuclear material in this category shall be
submitted periodically. The frequency of submission of such reports shall be agreed between the
Agency and India, taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections; however,
at least one such report shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such
reports be required in any year.
Routine Inspections
78. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in this category
shall be one inspection annually if the total amount of such material does not exceed five effective
kilograms, and shall be determined from the table in paragraph 67 of this Agreement if the
amount is greater.
D. PROVISIONS FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS
Introduction
79. Additional procedures applicable to the safeguarding of reprocessing plants are set out below.
16
Special Procedures
Reports
80. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be once each calendar month.
Inspections
81. A reprocessing plant having an annual throughput not exceeding 5 effective kilograms of nuclear
material, and the safeguarded nuclear material in it, may be routinely inspected twice a year.
A reprocessing plant, having an annual throughput exceeding 5 effective kilograms of nuclear
material, and the safeguarded nuclear material in it, may be inspected at all times. The
arrangements for inspections set forth in paragraph 60 of this Agreement shall apply to all
inspections to be made under this paragraph. It is understood that for plants having an annual
throughput of more than 60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would be normally
be implemented by means of continuous inspection.
82. When a reprocessing plant is under Agency safeguards only because it contains safeguarded
nuclear material, the inspection frequency shall be based on the rate of delivery of safeguarded
nuclear material.
83. India and the Agency shall cooperate in making all the necessary arrangements to facilitate the
taking, shipping or analysis of samples, due account being taken of the limitations imposed by the
characteristics of a plant already in operation when placed under Agency safeguards.
Mixtures of Safeguarded and Unsafeguarded Nuclear Material
84. India and the Agency may agree on the following special arrangements in the case of a
reprocessing plant which has not been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement,
submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral
arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement, and in which
safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear materials are present:
(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) below, the Agency shall restrict its safeguards
procedures to the area in which irradiated fuel is stored, until such time as all or any part of
such fuel is transferred out of the storage area into other parts of the plant. Safeguards
procedures shall cease to apply to the storage area or plant when either contains no
safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Where possible, safeguarded nuclear material shall be measured and sampled separately from
unsafeguarded material, and at as early a stage as possible. Where separate measurement,
sampling or processing are not possible, the whole of the material being processed in that
campaign shall be subject to the safeguards procedures set out in Part III.D of this Agreement.
At the conclusion of the processing the nuclear material that is thereafter to be safeguarded
shall be selected by agreement between India and the Agency from the whole output of the
plant resulting from that campaign, due account being taken of any processing losses accepted
by the Agency.
E. PROVISIONS FOR CONVERSION PLANTS, ENRICHMENT PLANTS AND
FABRICATION PLANTS
Introduction
85. Additional procedures applicable to conversion plants and fabrication plants are set out below.
This terminology is synonymous with the term "a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear
17
material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant)" which is used in paragraph 117 of this
Agreement.
86. In the event that India decides to offer an enrichment plant in the future as a facility subject to this
Agreement, the Agency and India shall consult and agree on the application of the Agency’s
safeguards procedures for enrichment plants before any such facility is added to the Annex.
Special Procedures
Reports
87. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be once each calendar month.
Inspections
88. A conversion plant or a fabrication plant which has been supplied wholly or substantially under a
project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a
bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards
agreement, and the nuclear material in it, may be inspected at all times if the plant inventory at
any time, or the annual input, of nuclear material exceeds five effective kilograms. Where neither
the inventory at any time, nor the annual input, exceeds five effective kilograms of nuclear
material, the routine inspections shall not exceed two a year. The arrangements for inspections set
forth in paragraph 57 of this Agreement shall apply to all inspections to be made under this
paragraph. It is understood that, for plants having an inventory at any time, or an annual input, of
more than 60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would normally be implemented
by means of continuous inspection. Where neither the inventory at any time nor the annual input
exceeds one effective kilogram of nuclear material, the plant would not normally be subject to
routine inspection.
89. When a conversion plant or a fabrication plant which has not been supplied wholly or
substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by
the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under
a safeguards agreement contains safeguarded nuclear material, the frequency of routine
inspections shall be based on the inventory at any time and the annual input of safeguarded
nuclear material. Where the inventory at any time, or the annual input, of safeguarded nuclear
material exceeds five effective kilograms the plant may be inspected at all times. Where neither
the inventory at any time, nor the annual input, exceeds five effective kilograms of safeguarded
nuclear material, the routine inspections shall not exceed two a year. The arrangements for
inspection set forth in paragraph 60 shall apply to all inspections to be made under this paragraph.
It is understood that, for plants having an inventory at any time, or an annual input, of more than
60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would normally be implemented by means
of continuous inspection. Where neither the inventory at any time nor the annual input exceeds
one effective kilogram of nuclear material, the plant would not normally be subject to routine
inspection.
90. The intensity of inspection of safeguarded nuclear material at various steps in a conversion plant
or a fabrication plant shall take account of the nature, isotopic composition and amount of
safeguarded nuclear material in the plant. Safeguards shall be applied in accordance with the
general principles set forth in paragraphs 4 to 8 of this Agreement. Emphasis shall be placed on
inspection to control uranium of high enrichments and plutonium.
91. Where a plant may handle safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material, India shall notify the
Agency in advance of the programme for handling safeguarded batches to enable the Agency to
make inspections during these periods, due account being also taken of the arrangements under
paragraph 92 of this Agreement.
18
92. India and the Agency shall cooperate in making all the necessary arrangements to facilitate the
preparation of inventories of safeguarded nuclear material and the taking, shipping and/or analysis
of samples, due account being taken of the limitations imposed by the characteristics of a plant
already in operation when placed under Agency safeguards.
Residues, Scrap and Waste
93. India shall ensure that safeguarded nuclear material contained in residues, scrap or waste created
during conversion or fabrication is recovered, as far as is practicable, in its facilities and within a
reasonable period of time. If such recovery is not considered practicable by India, India and the
Agency shall cooperate in making arrangements to account for and dispose of the material.
Safeguarded and Unsafeguarded Nuclear Material
94. India and the Agency may agree on the following special arrangements in the case of a conversion
plant or a fabrication plant which has not been supplied wholly or substantially under a project
agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or
multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement,
and in which safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material are both present:
(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) below, the Agency shall restrict its safeguards
procedures to the area in which safeguarded nuclear material is stored, until such time as all
or any part of such nuclear material is transferred out of the storage area into other parts of the
plant. Safeguards procedures shall cease to be applied to the storage area or plant when it
contains no safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Where possible, safeguarded nuclear material shall be measured and sampled separately from
unsafeguarded nuclear material, and at as early a stage as possible. Where separate
measurement, sampling or processing is not possible, any nuclear material containing
safeguarded nuclear material shall be subject to the safeguards procedures set out in Part III.E
of this Agreement. At the conclusion of processing, the nuclear material that is thereafter to
be safeguarded shall be selected, in accordance with paragraph 96 of this Agreement when
applicable, by agreement between India and the Agency, due account being taken of any
processing losses accepted by the Agency.
Blending of Nuclear Material
95. When safeguarded nuclear material is to be blended with either safeguarded or unsafeguarded
nuclear material, India shall notify the Agency sufficiently in advance of the programme of
blending to enable the Agency to exercise its right to obtain evidence, through inspection of the
blending operation or otherwise, that the blending is performed according to the programme.
96. When safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material are blended, if the ratio of fissionable
isotopes in the safeguarded component going into the blend to all the fissionable isotopes in the
blend is 0.3 or greater, and if the concentration of fissionable isotopes in the unsafeguarded
nuclear material is increased by such blending, then the whole blend shall remain subject to
safeguards. In other cases, the following procedures shall apply:
(a) Plutonium/plutonium blending: The quantity of the blend that shall continue to be
safeguarded shall be such that its weight, when multiplied by the square of the weight fraction
of contained fissionable isotopes, is not less than the weight of originally safeguarded
plutonium multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of fissionable isotopes therein,
provided however that:
19
(i) In cases where the weight of the whole blend, when multiplied by the square of the
weight fraction of contained fissionable isotopes, is less than the weight of originally
safeguarded plutonium multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of fissionable
isotopes therein, the whole of the blend shall be safeguarded; and
(ii) The number of fissionable atoms in the portion of the blend that shall continue to be
under safeguards shall in no case be less than the number of fissionable atoms in the
originally safeguarded plutonium;
(b) Uranium/uranium blending: The quantity of the blend that shall continue to be safeguarded
shall be such that the number of effective kilograms is not less than the number of effective
kilograms in the originally safeguarded uranium, provided however that:
(i) In cases where the number of effective kilograms in the whole blend is less than in the
safeguarded uranium, the whole of the blend shall be safeguarded; and
(ii) The number of fissionable atoms in the portion of the blend that shall continue to be
under safeguards shall in no case be less than the number of fissionable atoms in the
originally safeguarded uranium;
(c) Uranium/plutonium blending: The whole of the resultant blend shall be safeguarded until the
uranium and the plutonium constituents are separated. After separation of the uranium and
plutonium, safeguards shall apply to the originally safeguarded component; and
(d) Due account shall be taken of any processing losses agreed upon between India and the
Agency.
IV. AGENCY INSPECTORS
97. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 to 14, inclusive, of the Inspectors Document shall
apply to Agency inspectors performing functions pursuant to this Agreement. However,
paragraph 4 of the Inspectors Document shall not apply with regard to any facility or to nuclear
material to which the Agency has access at all times. The actual procedures to implement
paragraph 60 of this Agreement shall be agreed to between the Agency and India.
98. The relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency
(INFCIRC/9/Rev.2) shall apply to the Agency, its inspectors performing functions under this
Agreement and to any property of the Agency used by them in the performance of their functions
under this Agreement.
V. PHYSICAL PROTECTION
99. India shall take all suitable measures necessary for the physical protection of the facilities and
nuclear material subject to this Agreement, taking into account the recommendations made in
Agency's document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, as may be amended from time to time.
VI. SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
100. India shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all items subject
to safeguards under this Agreement, in accordance with provisions to be set out in the Subsidiary
Arrangements.
20
VII. FINANCE
101. India and the Agency shall each bear any expense incurred in the implementation of their
responsibilities under this Agreement. The Agency shall reimburse India for any special expenses,
including those referred to in paragraph 6 of the Inspectors Document, incurred by India or
persons under its jurisdiction at the written request of the Agency, if India notified the Agency
before the expense was incurred that reimbursement would be required. These provisions shall not
prejudice the allocation of expenses attributable to a failure by either India or the Agency to
comply with this Agreement.
102. India shall ensure that any protection against third party liability, including any insurance or
other financial security, in respect of a nuclear incident occurring in a facility under its
jurisdiction shall apply to the Agency and its inspectors when carrying out their functions under
this Agreement as that protection applies to nationals of India.
VIII. NON-COMPLIANCE
103. If the Board determines in accordance with Article XII.C of the Statute of the Agency that
there has been any non-compliance by India with this Agreement, the Board shall call upon India
to remedy such non-compliance forthwith, and shall make such reports as it deems appropriate. In
the event of failure by India to take full remedial action within a reasonable time, the Board may
take any other measures provided for in Article XII.C of the Statute. The Agency shall promptly
notify India in the event of any determination by the Board pursuant in this regard.
IX. COOPERATION, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
104. The Agency and India shall cooperate to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.
105. At the request of either India or the Agency, there shall be consultations about any question
arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement. India and the Agency shall
endeavour to settle by negotiation any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this
Agreement. India shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation
or application of the Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite India to
participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.
106. In the event of any question or questions arising from the implementation of this Agreement,
the Agency shall provide India with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of such
questions. The Agency shall not draw any conclusions in connection with the question or
questions until India has had an opportunity to provide clarifications.
X. FINAL CLAUSES
107. India and the Agency shall, at the request of either of them, consult about amending this
Agreement.
108. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from India
written notification that India’s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force
have been met.
109. This Agreement shall remain in force until, in accordance with its provisions, safeguards have
been terminated on all items subject to this Agreement, or until terminated by mutual agreement
of the parties to this Agreement.
21
XI. DEFINITIONS
110. "Agency" means the International Atomic Energy Agency.
111. "Board" means the Board of Governors of the Agency.
112. "Campaign" means the period during which the chemical processing equipment in a
reprocessing plant is operated between two successive wash-outs of the nuclear material present
in the equipment.
113. "Conversion plant" means a facility (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant) to improve
unirradiated nuclear material, or irradiated nuclear material that has been separated from fission
products, by changing its chemical or physical form so as to facilitate further use or processing.
The term conversion plant includes the facility's storage and analytical sections. The term does
not include a plant intended for separating the isotopes of nuclear material.
114. "Director General" means the Director General of the Agency.
115. "Effective kilograms" means:
(i) In the case of plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
(ii) In the case of uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1 %) and above, its weight in
kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
(iii) In the case of uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1 %) and above 0.005 (0.5 %), its
weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and
(iv) In the case of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below, and in the
case of thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.
116. "Enrichment plant" means a plant for separating the isotopes of nuclear material.
117. "Facility" means, for the purposes of this Agreement:
(i) A "principal nuclear facility", which means a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear
material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of a nuclear material, a
plant for processing or fabricating nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing
plant) or a facility or plant of such other type as may be designated by the Board from
time to time, including associated storage facilities, as well as a critical facility or a
separate storage installation;
(ii) A research and development facility as defined in paragraph 127 of this Agreement;
(iii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is
customarily used;
(iv) A plant for the upgrading of heavy water or a separate storage installation for heavy
water.
118. "Fabrication plant" means a plant to manufacture fuel elements or other components
containing nuclear material and includes the plant’s storage and analytical sections.
119. "Improved" means, with respect to nuclear material, that either:
22
(i) The concentration of fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
(ii) The amount of chemically separable fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
(iii) Its chemical or physical form has been changed so as to facilitate further use or
processing.
120. "Inspector" means an Agency official designated in accordance with the Inspectors
Document.
121. "Inspectors Document" means the Annex to the Agency's document GC(V)/INF/39.
122. "Nuclear material" means any source or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX
of the Statute.
123. "Produced, processed or used" means any utilization or any alteration of the physical or
chemical form or composition, including any change of the isotopic composition, of nuclear
material;
124. "Project agreement" means a safeguards agreement relating to an Agency project and
containing provisions as foreseen in Article XI.F.4.(b) of the Statute.
125. "Reactor" means any device in which a controlled, self-sustaining fission chain-reaction can
be maintained.
126. "Reprocessing plant" means a facility to separate irradiated nuclear materials and fission
products, and includes the facility’s head-end treatment section and its associated storage and
analytical sections. This term is synonymous with the term "a plant for processing nuclear
material irradiated in a reactor" which is used in paragraph 117 of this Agreement.
127. "Research and development facility" means a facility, other than a principal nuclear facility,
used for research or development in the field of nuclear energy.
128. "Statute" means the Statute of the Agency.
129. "Throughput" means the rate at which nuclear material is introduced into a facility operating
at full capacity.
130. "Unilaterally submitted" means submitted by India to Agency safeguards.
DONE at Vienna, on the day of 2008, in duplicate, in the English language.
For the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: For the INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY:
23
ANNEX
LIST OF FACILITIES SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
FACILITIES
FACILITY OFFERED FOR
SAFEGUARDS BY INDIA
DATE OF RECEIPT OF
NOTIFICATION
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THE HIMALAYAN DISASTER: TRANSNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT MECHANISM A MUST
We talked with Palash Biswas, an editor for Indian Express in Kolkata today also. He urged that there must a transnational disaster management mechanism to avert such scale disaster in the Himalayas.
http://youtu.be/7IzWUpRECJM
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THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS TALKS AGAINST CASTEIST HEGEMONY IN SOUTH ASIA
THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS TALKS AGAINST CASTEIST HEGEMONY IN SOUTH ASIA
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- Musharraf vendetta shackles Pakistan
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- Evil Rising: demonising the Mau Mau
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- 'What's Wrong With Senator Obama?'
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- Today in Palestine
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- Left, BSP join hands to fight UPA govt
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- Iran Would Attack Israel, US Navy in Gulf if Attacked
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- The Times Interviews John McCain
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- नदी बचाने की जंग
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- Move to approach court against NEEPCO
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- *The aftermath of BJP sponsored Bandh*
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- OECD Countries Produce 85% of World Nuclear Power (C)
- . Green Energy- Nuclear Power for Switzerland & Ja...
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- Disquiet Ghosts: Mass graves in Kashmir
- FOR $2 BILLION U.S. URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT
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- Junta Favours Elections Over Relief Operations
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